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Workers' Compensation
by
H. Michael Bagley*
Daniel C. Kniffen*"

Katherine D. Dixon...
and
Marion H. Martin****
The 1997-98 survey period was marked by a relatively calm legislative
session with respect to workers' compensation, in sharp contrast to the
significant legislation that has reshaped the Georgia's Workers'
Compensation Act this decade. As usual, however, the appellate courts
were active in the workers' compensation arena, issuing decisions over
a broad range of issues. In particular, significant rulings affected
change in condition cases, the intoxication defense, and the ongoing issue
of psychological injury.
I. LEGISLATION
As it has virtually every year this decade, the 1998 General Assembly
made a number of amendments to the Georgia Workers' Compensation
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Act ("the Act").' For the first time in many years, however, the
maximum rate for disability benefits was not increased and was left at
the levels established in 1997.2 Although none of the 1998 amendments
can be considered as significant as some of the dramatic changes made
in recent years, a number of amendments specifically impact the
litigation of workers' compensation cases and are therefore required
reading for practitioners in this area.
A.

Admissibility of Evidence
An amendment to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-102 now allows laboratory test
reports, performed pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-415, into evidence
with an accompanying affidavit from the laboratory confirming
authenticity.3 In addition, the amendment excludes the applicability of
O.C.G.A. section 24-3-18 from workers' compensation claims.4 The
amendment will simplify the trial of intoxication cases under O.C.G.A.
section 34-5-17 by obviating the need for authenticating laboratory
results through witness testimony.'
B.

Calculationof Average Weekly Wage
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-260 was amended to change the calculation of
the average weekly wage of the Georgia National Guard serving on state
active duty to the greater of: (1) seven-thirtieths of the monthly pay and
allowances of the individual at the time of the injury, adjusted for
appropriated increases in such monthly pay and allowances; or (2) the
average weekly wage of the individual in his or her other employment
at the time of the injury, or if such individual worked at the time of the
injury for more than one employer, the combined average weekly wage
of the individual in such multiple employment.'
C.

Calculationof Temporary PartialDisabilityBenefits
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104 was amended regarding the calculation of
temporary partial disability benefits when an employee had experienced
a change in condition and had been released to light duty by the
authorized treating physician.'
The amount of temporary partial
disability benefits shall be the maximum allowed under O.C.G.A. section

1. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 (1998).
2. See id. §§ 34-9-261, -262.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id. §§ 34-9-102, -415.
Id. § 24-3-18.
Id. § 34-5-17.
Id. § 34-9-260.
Id. § 34-9-104.
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34-9-262 unless the employee was receiving less than such maximum
amount, in which event the employee would continue to receive benefits
as provided by section 34-9-261.8 This amendment resolves an uncertainty created by the so-called "statutory change in condition" when
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(a)(3) was created in 1992 and legislatively
overrules case law to the contrary.9
D.

Penalty for Wrongly RetainingBenefits

An amendment to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-21 deletes the current penalty
provisions and adds penalties for any employee who is convicted of the
misdemeanor offense of knowingly and wilfully receiving and retaining
benefits to which he or she is not entitled.1 ° The offense is punishable
by a fine not to exceed $10,000 and no less than $1,000, or one year of
imprisonment, or both."
E.

Change of Physician

O.C.G.A. section 34-9-201 was amended to delete the sixty day
requirement imposed on an employee to unilaterally change physicians
when a conformed panel is used. 12 The amendment allows an employee
to make a one-time unilateral
change of physician at any time during
13
the pendency of the claim.
F

Suspension of Benefits

An amendment to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-204 deletes language
authorizing the suspension of income benefits for an employee's
unreasonable refusal to undergo surgical procedures. 4 The amendment
also adds a provision authorizing the suspension of benefits if an
employee has a subsequent nonwork-related injury which breaks the
chain of causation between the compensable injury and the employee's
disability. 5 This amendment responds to the supreme court's decision
in Hallisey v. Fort Howard Paper Co."6

8. Id. § 34-9-261 to -262.
9. See Mountainside Medical Center/Pickens Healthcare v. Tanner, 225 Ga. App. 722,
484 S.E.2d 706 (1997).
10. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-21 (1998).
11. Id.
12. Id. § 34-9-201.
13. Id.
14. Id. § 34-9-204.
15. Id.
16. 268 Ga. 57, 484 S.E.2d 653 (1997).
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G. Reimbursement
An amendment to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-265 authorizes an insurer or
self-insurer to obtain reimbursement when death benefits have been
17
paid to the State Board of Workers' Compensation in error.
H. Self-Insured Guaranty Trust Fund
Amendments by the General Assembly made housekeeping changes to
the provisions relating to the Self-Insurers Guaranty Trust Fund ("the
Fund"). 8 The legislation authorizes the Fund to levy penalties and
fines against self-insured employers.' 9 In addition, it requires the
Board of Trustees of the Fund to use the security deposit of a participant
to pay the workers' compensation obligation assumed by the Fund. °
An amendment to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-385 authorizes the Board of
Trustees to direct the Fund to honor and pay any contractual arrangement between an attorney and an employee, provided that application
is made and all parties are given notice and time to make any objections.21
I. Audits of Group Self-Insurance Funds
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-172 was amended to authorize the Commissioner
of Insurance to contract with private examiners to conduct the mandatory audits of group self-insurance funds to verify the solvency of the
funds. 22 The self-insurance funds are still required to pay the cost of
the examination.2" This allows the Commissioner of Insurance to hire
experienced auditors and, as a result, reduce the overall cost of
mandatory fund audits.
J.

Drug-Free Workplace
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-411 was amended by adding sections 34-9411(7.1) and 34-9-411(14.1) to include self-insured employers and group
self-insured employers in the definitions applicable to drug-free
workplace programs.2 4 O.C.G.A. section 34-9-412.1 was added to
authorize the State Board to certify self-insured employers or employer

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-265 (1998).
Id. § 34-9-380 to -389.
Id. § 34-9-384.
Id. § 34-9-387.
Id. § 34-9-385.
Id. § 34-9-172.
Id.

24. Id. § 34-9-411.
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members of a group self-insurance fund as "drug-free" workplaces if'all
the requirements of section 34-9-413 are met.25 The purpose of these
changes is to allow all employers within the state who have been
certified as drug-free by the State Board to obtain a 0.2% reduction in
the employers' contributions to unemployment tax.26
II.

PADGETT V. WAFFLE HOUSE: A RETALIATORY DISCHARGE REMEDY
IN GEORGIA?

Perhaps the most significant decision in the survey period was the
supreme court's holding in Padgett v. Waffle House, Inc.27 that a
claimant may prove a change in condition by demonstrating a compensable injury was the proximate cause of the claimant's termination from
employment.28 In reversing the court of appeals,29 the supreme court
interjected an entirely new line of inquiry into the workers' compensation system: whether an employer's motivation in terminating the
employment of a worker who has previously suffered an on-the-job injury
is retaliation for a workers' compensation claim. Although limited to
cases in which the claimant has the burden of proof to demonstrate a
change in condition, this holding promises to open a Pandora's box of
litigation in the workers' compensation system.
Scarlett O'Hara Padgett suffered a work-related injury while working
for Waffle House in February 1993 and received disability benefits until
she returned to light-duty work for Waffle House in November 1993. 3o
Padgett continued to perform light-duty work for nearly a year, receiving
temporary partial disability benefits pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 34-9262.31 Waffle House terminated Padgett's employment in September
1994 based upon three separate violations of company policy: (1)
fraudulently inflating commissions, (2) using profanity, and (3) sitting
in customer seating.3 2 The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found
that claimant met her burden of proof as to a change in condition by her
demonstration that one of these three violations, namely sitting in
customer seating, was related to her compensable injury.3 The AIJ,

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. § 34-9-412.1.
Id.
269 Ga. 105, 498 S.E.2d 499 (1998).
Id. at 106, 498 S.E.2d at 501.
Waffle House, Inc. v. Padgett, 225 Ga. App. 144, 483 S.E.2d 131 (1997).
269 Ga. at 106, 498 S.E.2d at 500.
Id. at 107, 498 S.E.2d at 501.
Id.
Id.
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therefore, concluded that claimant met her burden of proof demonstrating a change in condition. 4
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the supreme court's ruling
in Maloney v. Gordon County Farms35 required claimant to demonstrate
a diligent but unsuccessful search for suitable employment in order to
meet her burden of proof. 6 The court of appeals specifically held that
the cause of claimant's termination was not a proper subject of inquiry
into whether claimant had suffered a change in condition.
The supreme court reversed, however, holding that the requirement
of a "diligent but unsuccessful job search" does not apply if the claimant
establishes that the compensable injury was the proximate cause of the
subsequent termination:
The concern addressed in Maloney is that benefits should be awarded
only where the economic change for the worse is proximately caused by
the work-related injury. Proof of a diligent job search allows the Board
to infer this critical causal connection where the termination is for
reasons wholly unrelated to the injury. However, by proving that the
work-related injury is the proximate cause of the termination, the
claimant establishes the causal link between injury and worsened
economic condition. The causal link is the important element rather
than the method of proving it.3 8
Having reached this conclusion, the supreme court remanded the case
for a determination of whether claimant's compensable injury was the
"proximate cause" of her subsequent termination. 9
For the first time, therefore, the supreme court has interjected the
myriad questions that surround an employee's termination into the
workers' compensation system. Unfortunately, the court gave little
guidance regarding how a "causal connection" between a previous
compensable injury and subsequent employment termination should be
determined, noting simply that proximate cause is "more than incidental
cause."4 ° The fact that two of the three stated reasons for claimant's
termination did not relate to her compensable injury failed to persuade
the court that a factual issue remained as to the proximate cause of
claimant's termination because the court remanded the case for further

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
265 Ga. 825, 462 S.E.2d 606 (1995).
Id. at 828, 462 S.E.2d at 608.
Waffle House, 225 Ga. App. at 145, 483 S.E.2d at 132.
269 Ga. at 106, 498 S.E.2d at 501 (citation omitted).
Id. at 107, 498 S.E.2d at 502.
Id., 498 S.E.2d at 501-02.
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deliberation on this issue.41 The question remains, therefore, whether
proximate cause can be established if there is some evidence that
claimant's prior injury played any role in the decision to terminate
claimant's employment.
Many other jurisdictions have recognized, either by statute or by
judicial decision, a cause of action for "retaliatory discharge," which
occurs when a worker's employment is terminated in retaliation for the
pursuit of a workers' compensation claim.42 In prohibiting discrimina43
tion against the disabled, the Americans with Disabilities Act
essentially implements a federal retaliatory discharge statute. The
decision in Padgett, however, introduces for the first time into Georgia's
workers' compensation system the concept that an employer's termination of an employee can have a direct effect on that employee's receipt
of workers' compensation benefits. Previously, the reasons behind a
claimant's termination were irrelevant to a claim for additional disability
benefits except to show that the employer would no longer make work
available." Indeed, the court of appeals relied upon its prior decision
in Gilbert/Robinson,Inc. v. Meyers 45 for the proposition that Padgett's
termination was irrelevant to a consideration of whether she had
undergone a "change in condition"46 entitling her to additional disability benefits.4' The supreme court, however, specifically distinguished
Meyers because the claimant in that case was terminated by a subsequent employer. 4' The court did not mention numerous other decisions" in which claimants were terminated by the same employers that
provided workers' compensation benefits. Presumably these cases are
distinguishable under the court's new ruling because none of them
indicate that termination was for a cause related to the compensable
injury.

41. Id., 498 S.E.2d at 502.
42.

See 6 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION

§

68.36 (1998).

43. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
44. See Aden's Minit Market v. Landon, 202 Ga. App. 219, 413 S.E.2d 738 (1991)
(claimant terminated from job with subsequent employer when it learned she was also
drawing disability benefits from previous employer); Evco Plastics v. Burton, 200 Ga. App.
121, 407 S.E.2d 60 (1991) (claimant terminated for failing to report to work, allegedly
because knee pain precluded her from performing job); Brown v. Gulf Ins. Co., 141 Ga. App.

819, 234 S.E.2d 552 (1977) (claimant terminated by Georgia Power because he reconnected
the electricity to his home after it had been disconnected for nonpayment of his bill).
45. 214 Ga. App. 510, 448 S.E.2d 246 (1994).
46. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(a) (1998).
47. Waffle House, 225 Ga. App. at 145, 483 S.E.2d at 132.

48. 269 Ga. at 107, 498 S.E.2d at 501.
49. See cases cited supra note 44.
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Clearly an employer should not be able to benefit from terminating an
employee in retaliation for a compensable injury on the job.5 ° Without
specific guidelines, however, determinations as to an employer's motive
for terminating a previously injured worker can be left to sheer
speculation and conjecture rather than clear, evidentiary findings. For
this and other reasons, the supreme court has previously rejected a
public policy exception to the long established at-will employment
doctrine based upon an alleged retaliatory discharge for asserting a
workers' compensation claim.5 The mere fact that a termination
occurs after a worker has, at some time in the past, sustained an on-thejob accident should not give rise to an inference that the termination
was proximately caused by the previous compensable injury.
The decision in Padgettleaves unanswered numerous questions as to
what level of inquiry is proper to determine the proximate cause of
claimant's termination for the purposes of a change in condition hearing.
For example, should Ms. Padgett, upon the remand of her case, be
allowed to inquire about her employer's termination of other employees
who were injured at work to determine statistical evidence regarding the
termination of injured workers? If so, should this inquiry be limited to
her place of employment, or can it extend to other locations managed by
her employer? How far back in time should such an inquiry be
considered relevant? Is it sufficient to show that any part of her
termination was related to her compensable injury, or does "more than
incidental cause" mean that the compensable injury must have played
a primary role in the decision to terminate? Undoubtedly, each of these
questions will be the subject of much litigation before the State Board
of Workers' Compensation and will, at some point, need to be addressed
by Georgia's appellate courts.
III.

INTOXICATION AND DRUG TESTING II

In last year's article, we reported on the court of appeals holding in
Thomas v. Diamond Rug & Carpet Mills,"' and its substantial effect on
the intoxication defense found in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-17(b). 53 In the
most recent survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari

50. As noted above, the Americans with Disabilities Act already provides a federal
remedy against an employer who terminates a worker with a disability as defined by the

ADA. See supra note 43.
51.

Evans v. Bibb County, 178 Ga. App. 139, 342 S.E.2d 484 (1986).

52. 226 Ga. App. 403, 486 S.E.2d 664 (1997).
53.

H. Michael Bagley et al., Workers' Compensation, 49 MERCER L. REV. 383 (1997).

1998]

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

409

in this case and reversed the court of appeals.5 4 In so doing, the
supreme court ended the debate regarding how much notice an employee
must be given regarding the potential consequences of refusing a postaccident drug screen test and clarified potential constitutional issues
raised in the court of appeals decision.
Claimant in Thomas drove a forklift into a wall, causing injuries to his
left foot and ankle. Less than an hour before the accident, a supervisory
employee observed Thomas smoking what appeared to be a marijuana
pipe. A registered nurse at the hospital where treatment was provided
asked claimant to provide a urine specimen for the workers' compensation drug screen test. Claimant refused this request and three similar
requests made during the week he was hospitalized, despite his admitted
awareness that the employer required workers to submit to drug testing
after a work-related injury and that he could be terminated for refusing.
Thomas claimed, however, that he had not been told his refusal could
result in the denial of workers' compensation benefits.5 5
The court of appeals held that Thomas was entitled to workers'
compensation benefits because he was given no notice that his refusal
of a post-accident drug screen could result in the denial of his workers'
compensation claim." Specifically, the court of appeals held that such
notice was required by the Drug-free Workplace Act57 and "fundamental standards of due process. " "
The supreme court rejected both of the court of appeals bases for its
ruling.59
First, the supreme court noted that, in establishing a
rebuttable presumption of intoxication, O.C.G.A. section 34-9-17(b)(3)
refers only to the manner of performance of the scientific test in
referring to the Drug-free Work Place Act.6 ° The court held that the
mere reference to the testing procedure contained in the Drug-free Work
Place Act did not also incorporate other provisions within that statute,
including the notice provisions of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-414. 61 The
court also noted that, as a self-insured employer, Diamond Rug & Carpet
could not have taken advantage of the Drug-free Work Place Act
provisions because this statute merely provides a reduced premium to

54.
(1998).
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Georgia Self-Insurers Guar. Trust Fund v. Thomas, 269 Ga. 560, 501 S.E.2d 818
226 Ga. App. at 403-04, 486 S.E.2d at 665-66.
Id. at 406, 486 S.E.2d at 667.
O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-410 to -421 (1992 & Supp. 1997).
226 Ga. App. at 405, 486 S.E.2d at 667.
269 Ga. at 561, 501 S.E.2d at 819.
Id.
Id.
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insured employers that comply with the Act's provisions. 2 The court
therefore implicitly recognized not only that the "notice" provisions of the
Drug-free Work Place Act do not extend to the intoxication defense found
in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-17, but also that constitutional principles do not
impose a notice requirement on the rebuttable presumption included
within this defense.
The supreme court found neither due process nor equal protection
principles require a notice standard to be read into the portion of
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-17 that creates a rebuttable presumption of
intoxication where a claimant either tests positive for a defined level of
intoxication or refuses a reliable post-accident drug test.6 The court
noted that establishment of a conclusive presumption from drug tests
might violate due process requirements. 6' A rebuttable presumption,
however, was held to be valid provided that a rational connection exists
between what was proved and what was to be inferred: "Certainly, it is
not unreasonable to infer that an employee who 'unjustifiably' refused
to undergo a 'reliable, scientific test' performed in the 'manner'
prescribed by O.C.G.A. § 34-9-415 was under the influence of alcohol or
drugs and that this use of alcohol or drugs caused the injury."66 The
rebuttable presumption in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-17(b), therefore, merely
shifts the burden of proof from the employer to the claimant in certain
circumstances to demonstrate either that the claimant was not
intoxicated at the time of the accident or that the intoxication was not
the cause of the injury. 7 This presumption does not preclude a
claimant from recovering workers' compensation benefits when there is
evidence, either through a drug test or the unreasonable refusal of 6a
drug test, that claimant was intoxicated at the time of the injury.
Rather, in these limited circumstances, the burden simply shifts to the
employee to demonstrate that intoxication was not the cause of the
injury, a matter of proof that is particularly within claimant's sphere of
knowledge. 9
The supreme court also rejected the notion that equal protection
requires an employee to be given notice of the potential consequences of
refusing a post-accident drug test.70 The court noted that the rebutta-

62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 562, 501 S.E.2d at 820.
See id. at 560, 501 S.E.2d at 818.
Id.
Id.

66. Id.
67. Id.

68. Id.
69. Id.
70.

Id.
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ble presumption in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-17 applies equally to all
employees, without regard to whether their employers are within the
scope of the Drug-free Work Place Act.7 ' The court found that the
Drug-free Work Place Act's applicability only to insured employers, as
opposed to self-insured employers, did not create an impermissible
disparity among injured workers, particularly because the only effect of
the Drug-free Work Place Act is to provide a reduced premium to
employers who follow its provisions. 2
Chief Justice Benham, joined by Justice Hunstein, dissented, noting
that requiring an employer to give notice of the potential consequences
of refusing a post-accident drug test is not a heavy burden, especially
given the number of other notices that are required in the area of
workers' compensation.7 3 As the majority noted, however, such notice
is not required by O.C.G.A. section 34-9-17, and the fact this statute
refers only to the "manner" of performance of the post-accident drug test
"strongly implies the exclusion of the Act's other provisions." 4 Unless
and until the Georgia Legislature imposes a notice requirement within
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-17, employers will not be required to inform their
employees that an unreasonable refusal of a post-accident drug test can
potentially result in a denial of workers' compensation benefits.
V.

A.

OTHER CASE LAw DEVELOPMENT

Credit for Overpayment

An employer who pays an injured employee pursuant to a disability
plan, wage continuation plan, or a disability insurance policy is entitled
to take credit against any workers' compensation payments due to the
injured employee, up to the amount that such plan or policy is funded
by the employer.7 5 Employers must give ten days notice of the intent
to take this credit prior to a hearing, by use of a Form WC-243.7" In
Webb v. City of Atlanta,7 ' the employer did not follow the above
procedures but instead sought to take a credit after the fact.
Webb was awarded temporary total disability ("TTD") benefits in 1994
after a hearing while simultaneously receiving benefits under a cityfunded plan. The City did not raise the credit issue at the hearing but

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 563, 501 S.E.2d at 821.
Id. at 561, 501 S.E.2d at 819.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-243(b) (1998).
GA. BD. OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION R. 243 (1998).
228 Ga. App. 278, 491 S.E.2d 492 (1997).
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months later unilaterally suspended payment of TTD benefits to Webb
in an attempt to take credit for the overpayment.78 The court of
appeals did not dispute the employer's right to take a credit, but found
that the City should have raised the issue at the hearing.79 By failing
to do so, the City lost its entitlement to take the credit; the award of
benefits to employee was res judicata; and the attempt to "correct" the
error a year later by unilaterally suspending benefits was held to be
improper.8 °
In addition to taking a credit for employer-funded disability benefits,
the employer may also be entitled to obtain reimbursement from an
employee for workers' compensation disability benefits paid when not
owed. In Bahadori v. Sizzler #1543,81 Sizzler paid benefits to its
employee until he moved to South Carolina and began working for S &
S Cafeterias. Two years later, he filed a claim for a change in condition
against Sizzler, alleging that additional benefits were due because of his
renewed inability to work from September to December 1992, as a result
of the on-the-job injury. Sizzler voluntarily paid this claim, but
investigated a third claim for benefits filed by Bahadori and found that
he had actually been working continuously for S & S, even while
receiving TTD benefits.82
Sizzler requested a hearing to controvert Bahadori's claim and to seek
reimbursement of the benefits it paid on the second claim. Bahadori
withdrew his third claim for benefits and argued that his dismissal of
the third claim meant that Sizzler could not come after him for
reimbursement because adjudication of overpayment issues could only
take place in conjunction with a change in condition hearing. 3 The
court of appeals disagreed, however, stating that the Board's power to
order repayment of benefits is not limited to change in condition
cases."4 It noted that O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(d), which authorizes
the Board to adjudicate overpayment claims, is not tied to section 34-9104(b) regarding change in condition cases, and the legislative intent in
enacting this provision was to eliminate the need for an employer or
insurer to bring a civil action to recover any overpayment. 85 The court

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 278-79, 491 S.E.2d at 493.
Id. at 279, 491 S.E.2d at 493.
Id. at 279-80, 491 S.E.2d at 493-94.
230 Ga. App. 52, 505 S.E.2d 23 (1997).
Id. at 52, 505 S.E.2d at 24.
Id. at 52-53, 505 S.E.2d at 24.
Id. at 53, 505 S.E.2d at 24.
Id. at 54, 505 S.E.2d at 25.

1998]

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

413

also pointed to prior decisions ordering repayment of benefits in the
absence of a finding of a change in condition.8"
Bahadori's second argument was that the employer was barred from
recovery by the two-year statute of limitations period in O.C.G.A. section
34-9-104(b) which governs change in condition cases.8 7 The court of
appeals also rejected this argument.8" Again, it stated that O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-104(d) is not tied to section 34-9-104(b), such that the twoyear statute of limitations provision does not apply to reimbursement
cases.8 9 Finally, the court reasoned that imposing a two-year statute
of limitations upon reimbursement claims would result in an anomaly:
such claims are in the nature of an action for money had and received,
for which the applicable statute of limitations is four years.9 0 The court
ordered Bahadori to reimburse Sizzler and their insurer for the benefits
paid to him.9
B.

Aggravation of Pre-existing Condition
The definition of "injury" specifically includes "the aggravation of a
pre-existing condition by accident arising out of and in the course of
employment."9 2 However, each case is factually specific and thus, will
depend heavily upon the medical evidence and the employee's own
statements.
An employer will be responsible for treatment rendered due to the
aggravation of a psychological condition when it is aggravated by a
physical injury.93 In Logan v. St. Joseph Hospital,4 the employee
injured her neck while lifting a trash bag.95 A couple of years later, her
treating physician, a neurosurgeon, released her to return to work and
her temporary total disability benefits were suspended. Around that
same time, a psychologist interviewed her in connection with her
application for Social Security disability benefits and found that she
suffered from chronic pain syndrome and major or severe depression.
The psychologist recommended psychotherapeutic treatment, which the

86.
87.

Id. at 53-54, 505 S.E.2d at 24-25.
Id. at 54, 505 S.E.2d at 25.

88. Id.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 55, 505 S.E.2d at 25.
Id.
Id., 505 S.E.2d at 26.

92. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (1998).
93.

Id. § 34-9-1(4) states in pertinent part: "'[ilnjury' and 'personal injury' shall include

the aggravation of a preexisting condition by accident arising out of and in the course of
employment...."
94. 227 Ga. App. 853, 490 S.E.2d 483 (1997).
95. Id. at 856, 490 S.E.2d at 486.
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neurosurgeon later also recommended, but the employer refused to pay
for the treatment.9 6 The ALJ denied Logan's request for psychological
treatment, holding that "the weight of the evidence is not sufficient to
establish that any treatment.., would be related to the employee's prior
job injury, nor would it be reasonable and necessary to effect a cure, give
relief and return this employee to suitable employment."9 7 The
appellate division reversed the ALJ, finding that the employee had a
personality disorder which prolonged her pain for longer periods of time
than that felt by the average person and that she would benefit from
treatment.98

The court of appeals accepted the case after the superior court
reversed the appellate division.99 Findinthat g the superior court erred
in reversing the Board, the court reiterated the long-standing "rule" that
the employer takes the employee as it finds her,100 and therefore must
pay for the sequela of her original injury.'01
In Scapa Dryers Fabrics v. Murphy, °2 the employee's testimony and
medical evidence failed to support her claim that her job activities either
caused her pain or aggravated her injuries from a car accident. Murphy
injured her back and leg in a car accident in 1984 but continued working
for Scapa from 1984 to 1995.103 After she stopped working in March
1995, she told Scapa her condition was job-related.0 4 The ALJ and
the appellate division denied the claim, but the superior court reversed. 05 The court of appeals relied upon several grounds to reverse
the superior court and reinstate the Board's decision.' 6
The court determined that the Board properly considered statements
the employee made on her insurance claims forms which indicated the
condition did not result from a work injury.10 7 The fact that a supervisor told the employee to mark "sickness" rather than "job-related injury"
did not impact the claim because the employee herself told the supervisor that her pain arose out of a car accident and the employee actually
filled out and signed the forms herself.' 8 The court also noted that

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 857, 490 S.E.2d at 486.
Id. at 858, 490 S.E.2d at 487.
A & P Transp. v. Warren, 213 Ga. App. 60, 63, 443 S.E.2d 857, 860 (1994).
227 Ga. App. at 860, 490 S.E.2d at 489.
228 Ga. App. 48, 491 S.E.2d 146 (1997).
Id. at 48, 491 S.E.2d at 147.
Id.
Id. at 49, 491 S.E.2d at 148.
Id. at 50-51, 491 S.E.2d at 148-49.
Id. at 50, 491 S.E.2d at 148.
Id., 491 S.E.2d at 148-49.
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the medical evidence did not reflect complaints by the employee that her
back10 injury
was either caused by or aggravated by her work activi9
ties.

The employer will be responsible for the employee's disability only as
long as the work-related aggravation lasts."0 In Worthington Industries v. Sanks,"' the employee aggravated a congenital back problem
while working for Worthington in 1995.112 After physical therapy and
medical treatment, he returned to normal work."' "On January 18,
1996, his physician determined that he had reached maximum medical
improvement even though he continued to suffer pain 'aggravated by
prolonged sitting' as a full-time college student."" 4 In July 1996 the
employee was fired for reasons unrelated to the injury."5
The ALJ and the appellate division determined that, after the
employee reached maximum medical improvement, "his on-the-job injury
had resolved and was no longer the cause of any disability."116 The
employer carried its burden of proving the "injury-induced aggravation
had subsided" as of January 18, 1996."' However, the superior court
reversed the Board, finding that the employer must show that the
employee had returned to his pre-existing physical condition."'
The court of appeals reversed the superior court, finding that the
employer "needed only to establish that benefits were terminated
because [Sanks'] present disability was not causally connected with his
employment."' 19 The medical evidence allowed the AJ and the
appellate division to infer that the employee's continued pain and
disability had no causal relation to his prior injury at Worthington. 2 °
Instead, the problems were unrelated aggravations of his congenital

109. Id. at 51, 491 S.E.2d at 149.
110. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (1998) states that the injury is compensable "only for so long
as the aggravation of the preexisting condition continues to be the cause of the disability;
the preexisting condition shall no longer meet this criteria when the aggravation ceases to
be the cause of the disability."
111. 228 Ga. App. 782, 492 S.E.2d 753 (1997).
112. Id. at 782, 492 S.E.2d at 754.
113. Id. at 783, 492 S.E.2d at 754.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 784, 492 S.E.2d at 754.
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defect.121 The superior court was not authorized to substitute its own
reading of the evidence for that of the Board.'2 2
C. Deviation from Employment Duties
In a case of first impression, the court of appeals addressed whether
the Act applies to employees who deviate from their duties and are
injured while acting as Good Samaritans. 2 ' In Olde South Custom
Landscaping, Inc. v. Mathis, 24 the employee was a foreman for a
landscaping company. He was returning to the office in a company
truck when he noticed an elderly couple stranded in the emergency
lane.'2 5 The elderly man was trying to push the couple's car. Exiting
the freeway two exits later, the employee returned to help the couple.
While trying to push the couple's car, he suffered a fractured vertebra
and was paralyzed.'26
The employer refused to pay benefits, arguing that the employee
deviated from his duties.'27 The AUJ agreed with the employer that
the employee's deviation provided no benefit to the employer and noted
that a Good Samaritan exception to the deviation rule should be enacted
by the legislature. 2 ' The appellate division reversed, relying in part
upon a Florida decision,' 29 which found injuries sustained by a truck
driver who stopped to assist motorists involved in a head-on collision
were compensable. The superior court. affirmed the appellate division.130
The court of appeals noted that the Good Samaritan Rule is an
extension of the "positional risk doctrine."' 3' For an injury to be
compensable under the positional risk doctrine, it is only necessary for
the employee to prove that "his work brought him within range of the
danger by requiring his presence in the locale where the peril struck,
even though any other person present would have also been injured

121. Id.
122. Id., 492 S.E.2d at 755.
123. Olde S. Custom Landscaping, Inc. v. Mathis, 229 Ga. App. 316,317-18,494 S.E.2d
14, 16 (1997).
124. 229 Ga. App. 316, 494 S.E.2d 14 (1997).
125. Id. at 317, 494 S.E.2d at 16.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Rockhaulers, Inc. v. Davis, 554 So. 2d 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
130. 229 Ga. App. at 317, 494 S.E.2d at 16.
131. Id. at 318, 494 S.E.2d at 16.
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irrespective of his employment."13 2 However, the Good Samaritan Rule
is also an exception to the deviation rule, which provides that:
when an employee "steps aside from his employer's business to do some
act of his own, not connected with the employer's business, the
relationship of employer and employee ... is ... completely suspended,
and an accident occurring at that time, . . . does not arise out of the
employment
within the meaning of the Workman's Compensation
33
Act."
In Mathis the court of appeals found that there was no authority in
Georgia to adopt the Good Samaritan Rule, and that such a liberal
interpretation of the Workers' Compensation Act was best left to the
legislature."' The court was sympathetic to the employee's injuries
and recognized the employee's sense of decency, compassion, and
morality. However, the court declined to force the employer to bear the
costs incurred when its employee stepped aside from his job duties and
made the rescue attempt.3 5
D.

Standard of Review

The appellate courts always address a few cases that deal with the
standard of review. When the appellate division reverses the ALJ, it
must follow the mandate of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-103 which states that
findings of the ALJ "shall be accepted by the appellate division where
such findings are supported by a preponderance of competent and
credible evidence contained within the records." 13 6 The supreme court
recently clarified in Bankhead Enterprises v. Beavers37 that O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-103(a) permits the appellate division to vacate an AM's
findings of fact and conclusions of law and substitute alternative
findings when the ALJ's findings were not supported by a preponderance
of the competent and credible evidence. 3 ' According to Beavers, the
appellate division must weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of
the witnesses, and if it determines the ALJ's award is supported by a
preponderance of admissible evidence, the ALJ's award will be accept-

132. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 152 Ga. App. 566, 567, 263 S.E.2d 455, 456
(1979).
133. 229 Ga. App. at 318, 494 S.E.2d at 17 (quoting Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.
v. Souther, 110 Ga. App. 84, 85, 137 S.E.2d 705, 706 (1964)).
134. Id. at 319-20, 494 S.E.2d at 17-18.
135. Id. at 320, 494 S.E.2d at 18.
136. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-103(a) (1998).
137. 267 Ga. 506, 480 S.E.2d 840 (1997).
138. Id. at 507, 480 S.E.2d at 841.
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may substitute its own findings
ed.'39 If not, the appellate division
14
and enter an award accordingly.

Although the supreme court revisited the issue of the Board's standard
of review in Syntec Industries,Inc. v. Godfrey,'" including a constitutional challenge that O.C.G.A. section 34-9-103 violated due process by
impermissibly shifting the burden
of proof, the court summarily denied
14
the appeal, citing Bankhead.'

A more typical challenge to the standard of review was addressed in
Russ v. American Telephone & Telegraph.43 In that case, the ALJ
denied the employee's claim for benefits, finding she did not meet her
burden of making a diligent search for suitable employment. The
appellate division substituted its own award for that of the ALJ,finding
the employee did prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she
court reversed the appelmade a diligent job search. 144 The superior
145
late division, and an appeal followed.
The court of appeals noted that the superior court erred in returning
to the original findings of the ALL.'4' The superior court's role was
simply to review the appellate division's award. 47 Even though the
evidence was in conflict, the appellate division's award was supported by
some evidence, and therefore the superior court was bound by the "any
evidence" 4 standard to simply uphold the award of the appellate
division.

In two other cases, the appellate division substituted its own award
for that of the ALJ. In both Johnson v. Weyerhaeuser Co.'4

and

Owens-Brockway Packaging, Inc. v.Hathorn,15° the superior court
exceeded its powers when it reversed the appellate division. The court
of appeals reiterated that the superior court's duty was simply to affirm
the appellate division if any evidence supported the appellate division's
substituted findings. 151

139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 269 Ga. 170, 496 S.E.2d 905 (1998).
142. Id. at 171, 496 S.E.2d at 906.
143. 228 Ga. App. 858, 493 S.E.2d 46 (1997).
144. Id. at 859, 493 S.E.2d at 47.
145. Id.
146. Id., 493 S.E.2d at 47-48.
147. Id. at 859-60, 493 S.E.2d at 47-48.
148. Id., 493 S.E.2d at 48.
149. 231 Ga. App. 627, 499 S.E.2d 916 (1998).
150. 227 Ga. App. 110, 488 S.E.2d 495 (1997).
151. See, e.g., Johnson, 231 Ga. App. 627, 499 S.E.2d 916; Hathorn, 227 Ga. App. 110,
488 S.E.2d 495.
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Attorney Fees

Attorney fees may be assessed by the superior court. In Vulcan
152
Materials Co. v. Pritchett,
the employer appealed the Board's
decision ordering it to resume payment of temporary total disability
benefits and to pay medical bills, and also appealed the assessment of
attorney fees by the superior court. The employer contended that the
superior court erred in finding its appeal "frivolous"15 3 and should not
have awarded the employee attorney fees under O.C.G.A. section 9-151 4 .M However, the court of appeals affirmed, finding that the superior court is authorized to award attorney fees if a party appeals without
substantial justification.155 Because the imposition of sanctions was
a matter of trial court discretion, the court of appeals reviewed the
ruling for abuse of discretion only and declined to find that the superior
court abused its discretion.5 6
F

Borrowed Servant

In a tort case involving the employee of a temporary service, the
"borrowed servant doctrine" was invoked to obtain summary judgment
for the borrowing employer ("special master"). In Preston v. Georgia
Power Co.,"' the employee ("servant") was hired by ProTemps ("general master") and assigned to work for Ashland Chemical ("special
master"). After his injury, the employee filed a tort suit against Ashland
Chemical and another entity. Ashland Chemical contended that it was
protected by the application of the workers' compensation tort bar
158
because Preston was its borrowed servant at the time of his injury
The trial court granted summary judgment to Ashland, and Preston
appealed.159
The court of appeals recognized the three elements of the borrowed
servant doctrine: "(1) the special master had complete control and

152. 227 Ga. App. 530, 489 S.E.2d 558 (1997).
153. Id. at 532, 489 S.E.2d at 561.
154. Id. O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a) (1996 & Supp. 1998) states in pertinent part:
reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and expenses of litigation shall be
awarded to any party against whom another party has asserted a claim, defense,
or other position with respect to which there existed such a complete absence of
any justiciable issue of law or fact that it could not be reasonably believed that a
court would accept the asserted claim, defense, or other position.
155. 227 Ga. App. at 532, 489 S.E.2d at 561.
156. Id.
157. 227 Ga. App. 449, 489 S.E.2d 573 (1997).
158. Id. at 449, 489 S.E.2d at 575.
159. Id.
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direction of the servant for the occasion; (2) the general master had no
such control; and (3) the special master had the exclusive right to
discharge the servant."6 0 Based upon the evidence, the court found
that even if ProTemps retained some authority to remove Preston from
his position at Ashland Chemical, the actual inquiry should be whether
Ashland Chemical could have unilaterally discharged Preston (1) from
working on a specific
task it assigned and (2) from actually working for
161
Ashland Chemical.
Undisputed testimony showed that Ashland Chemical had the
unilateral authority to discharge Preston from work assignments and
had in fact moved him the morning of the accident from labeling cans to
cleaning rail cars.16 2 Because of this right, summary judgment for
Ashland Chemical was proper."
A similar result was reached in Lewis v. Georgia-PacificCorp.1 All
three prongs of the borrowed servant doctrine were met, and therefore
the employee's tort claim against the special master was barred based
upon the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation

Act. 165
G.

Change in Condition

Each year, several change in condition cases are accepted by the court
of appeals. In Webb v. City of Atlanta,66 the city argued that its
payment of disability benefits to an employee under a city-sponsored
disability plan constituted a change in condition. The facts of the case
showed that in September 1994 an ALJ ordered the city to pay
temporary total disability benefits to the employee. The city did not
appeal, but in May 1995, the city unilaterally suspended the employee's
workers' compensation benefits. The city argued that because the
employee received benefits under a city-sponsored disability plan during
the entire time that he had received workers' compensation benefits, the
city was entitled to a credit for the workers' compensation benefits
already paid. 67 Both the ALJ and the appellate division rejected the
city's argument, noting that the city had not raised the issue of the
credit at the first hearing in September 1994.168 Thus, the doctrine of

160.
161.
162.

Id. at 451, 489 S.E.2d at 576.
Id. at 451-52, 489 S.E.2d at 576.
Id. at 452, 489 S.E.2d at 577.

163.

Id.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

230 Ga. App. 201, 496 S.E.2d 280 (1998).
Id. at 201, 496 S.E.2d at 280.
228 Ga. App. 278, 491 S.E.2d 492 (1998).
Id. at 278-79, 491 S.E.2d at 493.
Id. at 279, 491 S.E.2d at 493.
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res judicata prevented the issue of set-off from being raised at the
subsequent hearing.'69
However, the superior court reversed the
Board."7 °
The court of appeals noted that a change in condition is "a change in
the wage-earning capacity, physical condition, or status of an employee
..which change must have occurred after the date on which the wageearning capacity, physical condition, or status of the employee ... was
last established by award ... "" The court of appeals found that the
superior court should not have substituted its judgment for that of the
Board. 7 2 Although increases in the city-sponsored disability payments
could constitute improvements in economic condition, the city did not
cite any authority showing
that such payments affected the employee's
13
wage-earning capacity.
H.

Change in Condition Versus New Accident

The court of appeals revisited this ever-confusing area of law in
Guarantee Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wade Investments. 74 The court
was asked to decide which insurer would be responsible for an employ175
ee's carpal tunnel syndrome when she finally ceased working.
Duckett was an employee of a dry cleaning business. In August 1993
she hurt her neck at work and after some months out, returned to work
in October 1994, keying customer and inventory data for the company.
She began to experience problems with her hands and was diagnosed in
October 1995 with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. Guarantee Mutual
was the employer's workers' compensation carrier through December 16,
1995. Gerber Life Insurance took over the coverage after that date. In
January 1996 her doctor recommended surgery, but the employee
declined and kept working. She finally stopped working due to a
worsening of her condition on March 27, 1996.176
The AJ and the appellate division found that the carpal tunnel
syndrome was caused by the job, and although the employee first
developed the condition while Guarantee Mutual was on the risk, she did
not become disabled until March 27, 1996, when Gerber Life was the

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 280, 491 S.E.2d at 494 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(a) (1996)).
Id.
Id. at 280-81, 491 S.E.2d at 494.
232 Ga. App. 328, 499 S.E.2d 925 (1998).
Id. at 328, 499 S.E.2d at 926.
Id.
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carrier. 77 The Board concluded that the employee had sustained a
new accident and injury as
of March 27, 1996, and found Gerber Life
17
responsible for the claim.

The superior court reversed the Board, finding no new accident
occurred after Gerber Life became the carrier.'79 In reversing the
superior court and reinstating the Board's award, the court of appeals
noted that although the employee did not literally sustain a new injury
on March 27, 1996, she became unable to work on that date. 8 °
Although the seminal case in this area, Central State Hospital v.
James,181 attempted to set out a bright-line test, the court in recent
years seemingly followed a "causation analysis" in determining which
employer accepts liability.12 The court seems to be demonstrating
once again with Wade that these issues are questions of fact for the ALJ
that should not be disturbed on appeal.
I.

Change in Condition: The Employee's Maloney Burden
The court of appeals reviewed several cases concerning whether an
employee seeking to recover additional disability benefits had established a change in condition consistent with the requirements of Maloney
v. Gordon County Farms.8 ' To meet the burden of proof under
Maloney, the employee must prove each element of a three-prong test:
(1) a loss of earning power as a result of a compensable work-related
injury, (2) physical limitations attributable to that injury, and (3) a
diligent but unsuccessful effort to secure suitable employment.'
As is clear from Russ v. American Telephone & Telegraph,8 ' different judges may render different opinions in their review of the same
evidence. Nancy Russ suffered a compensable back injury in April 1991
but returned to full-time work at AT&T. She was laid off in March 1994
and subsequently sought total disability benefits due to a change in
condition. The ALJ found that the employee did not make a diligent job
search and denied her reinstatement of benefits.' 86 The appellate

177. Id., 499 S.E.2d at 926-27.
178. Id. at 328-29, 499 S.E.2d at 927.
179. Id. at 329, 499 S.E.2d at 927.
180. Id.
181. 147 Ga. App. 308, 309-10, 248 S.E.2d 678, 679 (1978).
182. See, e.g., City of Marietta v. Kirby, 210 Ga. App. 566, 436 S.E.2d 762 (1993); H.
Michael Bagley & Daniel C. Kniffen, Change in Condition v. New Accident: Old Problems
Revisited, 40 MERCER L. REV. 961 (1989).
183. 265 Ga. 825, 462 S.E.2d 606 (1995).
184. Id. at 828, 462 S.E.2d at 608-09.
185. 228 Ga. App. 858, 493 S.E.2d 46 (1997).
186. Id. at 858, 493 S.E.2d at 47.
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division, however, determined that the employee proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she did make a diligent unsuccessful job
search.1 8 7 Relying upon evidence in the record that the employee
applied and interviewed for jobs with other employers and sent resumes
to employers whose names a rehabilitation counselor provided, the
appellate division substituted its award for that of the ALJ and allowed
the employee to recover disability benefits.1 88 The court of appeals
relied upon the "any evidence" standard in upholding the Board's
award. 9
In another Maloney case, the issue was whether the employee was
totally disabled or whether she had light duty restrictions.190 In West
Marietta Hardware v. Chandler,'9' the employee was injured on
September 13, 1993 when two metal shelves fell on her, hitting the left
side of her head. After two weeks off, the employee returned to work.
Although she had many complaints associated with the incident, she
continued with her job until she voluntarily resigned in February
1995.192
The employee began treatment in August 1994 with Dr. Donald Orr,
who diagnosed her with thoracic outlet syndrome.'93 On May 8, 1995,
Dr. Orr instructed the employee not to return to work "while additional
investigation for this disorder [was] pursued." 9 4 An independent
evaluation by Dr. Robert Gilbert resulted in a rejection of the thoracic
outlet diagnosis."' Dr. Gilbert also found that the employee could
perform normal duties.' 96 The employee requested a hearing for
reinstatement of benefits. The ALJ and the appellate division found
that because Dr. Orr declared her totally disabled, the employee did not
have to meet the Maloney burden of making a sincere search for suitable
employment. 197
The employer appealed, pointing to Dr. Orr's deposition testimony that
98
the employee could do some work, provided it was not repetitive.
The court of appeals found that, although there was some evidence that

187. Id. at 860, 493 S.E.2d at 48.
188. Id.
189.

Id.

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

West Marietta Hardware v. Chandler, 227 Ga. App. 436, 489 S.E.2d 584 (1997).
227 Ga. App. 436, 489 S.E.2d 584 (1997).
Id. at 436-37, 489 S.E.2d at 585.
Id. at 437, 489 S.E.2d at 585.
Id.
Id., 489 S.E.2d at 586.

196.

Id.

197. Id. at 437-38, 489 S.E.2d at 586.
198. Id. at 438, 489 S.E.2d at 586.
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the employee was able to do light work, the Board was authorized to
conclude that the employee "was totally disabled and need not engage
in a purposeless demonstration of that disability by seeking work she
could not perform."'99
In Risner v. Bulk Equipment Manufacturing, Inc.,2 ° the employee
suffered a back injury on May 30, 1995. He returned to work at a light
duty janitorial job until December 18, 1995. On that day, he complained
about his back hurting and went home early. He returned to work two
days later and was terminated because he failed a drug test. He
subsequently filed a claim for temporary total disability benefits.20 1
The ALJ found that the employee continued to suffer physical
limitations attributable to the back injury and that he made a diligent
but unsuccessful job search after January 12, 1996.202 Nevertheless,
the ALJ denied the claim because the employee lost his job for
cause.203 He had, therefore, not shown that a diminution in his
earning power was due to his injury.2 '" The appellate division reversed, finding that an employee who is terminated for cause can still
prove a change in condition and entitlement to benefits by showing that,
as a result of the continuing disability, the employee was unable to find
suitable work.20 '
The superior court reversed the appellate division, and the court of
appeals accepted the case to review whether the appellate division
properly based its award on evidence in the record.20 6 The court of
appeals noted the law allows an employee who was terminated for cause
to recover disability benefits by showing that the inability to obtain
other suitable employment was due to a continuing disability attributable to a work-related injury.20 7 Judge Beasley, concurring specially,
pointed out that Maloney was about inferences,2 8 and that while the
AL did not infer from the evidence that the employee's lack of success
in finding a job was due to the job-related injury, the appellate division
apparently drew that inference from evidence of Risner's physical
condition and unsuccessful job search.20 9

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
229 Ga. App. 529, 494 S.E.2d 304 (1997).
Id. at 529, 494 S.E.2d at 304.
Id.
Id., 494 S.E.2d at 304-05.
Id., 494 S.E.2d at 305.
Id.
Id. at 529-30, 494 S.E.2d at 305.
Id. at 530, 494 S.E.2d at 305.
Maloney, 265 Ga. at 828, 462 S.E.2d at 609.
229 Ga. App. at 530-31, 494 S.E.2d at 305-06.
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Change in Condition: The Employer's Burden of Proof
If an employee is released to normal-duty work by the authorized
treating physician, the employer has the burden of proof at the
hearing.2 1 The burden of proof in a change in condition case is on the
employer when the employer unilaterally suspends benefits on the basis
that an employee's authorized treating physician released him to return
to work.211 In Vulcan Materials Co. v. Pritchett,2 2 the AJ improperly placed the
burden of proof upon the employee to prove his continu21

ing disability.

In a change in condition case which authorizes the employer to
suspend benefits based upon an employee's actual return to work, the
employer has the burden of proving (1) a physical change in the
employee for the better, (2) an ability to return to work because of the
change, and (3) the availability 'of work to decrease or terminate loss of
income.2 1 4

In Smith v. Brown Steel, 21 ' employee sustained a back

injury and after surgery was given light duty restrictions. Based upon
an alleged return to work, the employer unilaterally suspended
benefits.
At the hearing, the AJ properly placed the burden of proving the
employee's change in condition upon the employer. 217 The evidence
showed that the employee visited construction sites and occasionally
helped workers lift objects. The employee testified that he was not
working but explained that he was trying to learn building codes so he
could someday work as a contractor. Although additional evidence
showed that the employee could regularly play golf, go deer hunting with
a bow, and ride a jet ski, the ALJ concluded that the employee had not
actually returned to work. Because the employee had not been released
to regular duty work, and Brown Steel could not show the availability

210. Southwire Co. v. Molden, 223 Ga. App. 389, 477 S.E.2d 646 (1996).
211. See, e.g., Southwire Co. v. Molden, 223 Ga. App. 389, 477 S.E.2d 646 (1996);
Georgia Power Co. v. Leonard, 215 Ga. App. 383, 451 S.E.2d 74 (1994); Johnson Controls,
Inc. v. McNeil, 211 Ga. App. 783, 440 S.E.2d 528 (1994).
212. 227 Ga. App. 530, 489 S.E.2d 558 (1997).
213. Id. at 532, 489 S.E.2d at 561.
214. See, e.g., Freeman v. Continental Baking Co., 212 Ga. App. 855, 856, 443 S.E.2d
520, 521-22 (1994); Hercules, Inc. v. Adams, 143 Ga. App. 91, 92, 237 S.E.2d 631, 632
(1977).
215. 232 Ga. App. 698, 503 S.E.2d 592 (1998).
216. Id. at 698, 503 S.E.2d at 592.
217. Id. at 700, 503 S.E.2d at 593.
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of other suitable work, the ALJ found that Brown Steel had not proved
a change in condition for the better.21
K

ControvertingBenefits
The court of appeals addressed a procedural issue involving controverting benefits in CumberlandDistributionServices, Inc. v. Fuson."9 The
employee suffered a neck injury on June 9, 1995. After his termination
for cause on October 31, 1995, he sought disability benefits, and the
employer commenced benefits. When the employer subsequently learned
that the employee was working, it suspended benefits on April 9, 1996,
based upon a change in condition-Fuson's return to work. As the case
was investigated, the employer learned that Fuson had a history of prior
neck problems dating back to four days before the alleged June 9, 1995
injury. Based upon this newly discovered evidence, the employer
controverted the entire case on May 14, 1996.220
At a hearing, the ALJ concluded the evidence was insufficient to
support a suspension of benefits based upon the alleged return to
work.22 ' However, the ALJ found that Fuson lied about his previous
neck problems and an earlier workers' compensation claim.222 Because
the newly discovered evidence established that Fuson's neck problem
pre-existed his work for Cumberland, the ALJ found that Cumberland
was authorized to suspend benefits on April 9, 1996 and assessed a total
of $15,000 in civil penalties against Fuson for having advanced
fraudulent claims.223
Fuson appealed, arguing that O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221(i) required the
employer to give him ten days notice before "suspending" his benefits on
April 9, 1996.224 The superior court agreed with the employee, and the
court of appeals accepted the case for review. 225 The employee argued
that the employer failed to pay all benefits due before filing its notice to
controvert.226 However, the court of appeals noted that because the
suspension of benefits on April 9, 1996 related to the alleged return to

218. Id. at 698-99, 503 S.E.2d at 593.
219. 228 Ga. App. 380, 492 S.E.2d 2 (1997).
220. Id. at 380, 492 S.E.2d at 3.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 380-81, 492 S.E.2d at 3.
224. Id. at 381, 492 S.E.2d at 4.
225. Id., 492 S.E.2d at 3.
226. An employer may not file a controvert (after the case has been accepted and
benefits thereafter paid without an award) unless it pays all benefits due, including
penalties, before filing the notice to controvert. Cartersville Ready Mix Co. v. Hamby, 224
Ga. App. 116, 479 S.E.2d 767 (1996).
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work, the employer did not have to give ten days notice.227 The court
of appeals pointed out that because Fuson's benefits were already
suspended at the time the insurer discovered the basis for controverting
the entire claim, and even though the employer did not actually prevail
on this theory at the hearing, the ten-day advance notice requirement
of
228
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221(i) was inapplicable as to the controvert.
L.

Coverage

The court addressed several cases involving workers' compensation
coverage issues. In Home Insurance Co. v. Sunrise Carpet Industries,229 the trial court determined that Home's suit to recover additional premiums was without merit.23 When Home attempted to obtain
additional premiums from Sunrise, the court of appeals found that Home
did not comply with the provisions of its own contract 231 nor with
NCCI regulations which require that an increase in premium may not
be demanded in the last ninety days of coverage.232 The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to
Sunrise. 33
In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Paul Associates, Inc.,234
an insurer brought an action against an insurance agent, an insured,
and its principals to recover for negligently misrepresenting that the
insured qualified for coverage through the assigned risk pool. The
insurer sought to recover premiums from the insured and principals.
After a jury verdict in favor of USF&G on the breach of contract claim,
negligent misrepresentation, and contributions from the principals, an
appeal followed. 235 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court,
finding (1) that the insurer had a right to rely on representations in the
insurance application without conducting an independent investigation,

227. 228 Ga. App. at 382, 492 S.E.2d at 4. "Suspension of benefits at any time on the
grounds of change in condition requires advance notice of 10 days unless the employee has
actually returned to work." GA. BD. OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION R. 221(i)(1) (1998).
228. 228 Ga. App. at 382, 492 S.E.2d at 4.
229. 229 Ga. App. 268, 493 S.E.2d 641 (1997).
230. Id. at 271, 493 S.E.2d at 644.
231. Id. Any ambiguities in an insurance contract will be strictly construed against the
insurer as the drafter of the contract. Hulsey v. Interstate Life, 207 Ga. 167, 60 S.E.2d 353
(1950).
232. 229 Ga. App. at 272, 493 S.E.2d at 644. NCCI Manual Rule IV(G)(2)c prohibits
any change in classification of employees in the last ninety days of coverage if the change
in classification would increase the premiums.
233. 229 Ga. App. at 271-72, 493 S.E.2d at 644-45.
234. 230 Ga. App. 243, 496 S.E.2d 283 (1998).
235. Id. at 243-44, 496 S.E.2d at 285-86.
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(2) that the jury was authorized to return separate verdicts against the
agent and principals, (3) that the principals could be held liable to the
insurer for the pre-incorporation expenses of the insured, and (4) that
the insured's failure to pay premiums did not relieve the agent of
liability for negligent misrepresentation.2 6 This case demonstrates the
responsibility that employers and even agents have to submit accurate
applications and supporting documentation for workers' compensation
coverage and the consequences that can result when an insured fails to
comply with contractual obligations.
In T&R Custom, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,23 the court
of appeals agreed with the trial court that an independent insurance
broker (Venture) was not an agent of the insurer (Liberty) for the
purpose of collecting premiums from the employer.23 8s Despite the
contention that T&R paid the premiums to Venture,239 and that
Venture acted in a dual capacity as an agent for both the insurer and
the insured, the evidence and the law24° supported a finding that
Venture was not Liberty's agent for the collection of premiums.24'
M. Exclusive Remedy
In recent years, there have been attempted attacks upon the exclusive
remedy doctrine. 242 This year was certainly no exception. However,
in the wake of the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Doss v. Food
Lion, Inc. ,243 the courts have appeared to wholeheartedly re-embrace
the idea that the exclusive remedy for any damages arising out of or in
the course of employment is found in the Workers' Compensation Act.
In Potts v. UAP-GA AG CHEM, Inc.,24 the widow of the deceased
employee received workers' compensation benefits but also brought a

236. Id. at 244-48, 496 S.E.2d at 286-89.
237. 227 Ga. App. 144, 488 S.E.2d 705 (1997).
238. Id. at 144-45, 488 S.E.2d at 706-07.
239. T&R asserted that it paid the premium to Venture. Venture filed bankruptcy in
July 1993 and its principal, Conway, was indicted on 35 counts of theft by deception and
pleaded guilty to three of those counts. He was ordered to pay $83,273 in restitution. 227
Ga. App. at 144 n.1, 488 S.E.2d at 706 n.1.
240. Independent agents or brokers are generally considered the agent of the insured,
not the insurer. Kirby v. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co., 213 Ga. App. 673, 678, 445 S.E.2d
791, 795 (1994).
241. 227 Ga. App. at 144-45, 488 S.E.2d at 707.
242. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11 (1998). See generally H. Michael Bagley et al., Workers'
Compensation, 48 MERCER L. REV. 583, 584-88 (1996).
243. 267 Ga. 312,477 S.E.2d 577 (1996). The court held that the exclusivity provisions
of the Workers' Compensation Act precluded an independent cause of action for intentional
delay in authorizing medical treatment. Id. at 313, 477 S.E.2d at 578.
244. 227 Ga. App. 841, 490 S.E.2d 432 (1997).
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claim against the employer for wrongful death, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and fraud.2 45 Addressing whether claims based
upon the widow's allegations that the fatal chemical poisoning was
intentionally inflicted by a co-worker were viable, the court of appeals
noted the Workers' Compensation Act was the sole remedy both for
injuries negligently inflicted on the job and for injuries intentionally
inflicted on the job-so long as the tortious act was related to the
employer's business. 2 4
Thus, the widow's claims were held to be
barred.247
Flint Electric Membership Corp. v. Ed Smith Construction Co.2"
involved an indirect attempt to hold an employer liable outside the
bounds of the Workers' Compensation Act. In that case, Lee was
shocked while working for Ed Smith Construction Company.249 He
and his wife brought a claim against Flint for violations of the Highvoltage Safety Act.25 ° Flint impleaded the construction company, as
provided under the indemnity provisions of that Act.251 The court of
appeals held that the High-voltage Safety Act was not an exception to
the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act and
affirmed
the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the employ2
25

er.

Finally, in Holton v. Georgia Power Co.,253 the court of appeals held
that a statutory employer was also protected by the exclusive remedy
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act.254
N.

Farm Laborers Exemption

The issue of whether an employee is a farm laborer who is exempt
from coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act does not arise
often.255 However, in 1997 the court of appeals in J & C Poultry v.
Reyes-Guzman 2 6 determined, as a matter of law, that an employee of
a company responsible for gathering, boxing, and loading chickens is not

245. Id. at 841, 490 S.E.2d at 432.
246. Id. at 845-46, 490 S.E.2d at 435.
247. Id.
248. 229 Ga. App. 838, 495 S.E.2d 136 (1997).
249. Id. at 838, 495 S.E.2d at 137.
250. See O.C.G.A. §§ 46-3-30 to -40 (1998).
251. Id. § 46-3-40(b).
252. 229 Ga. App. at 839-40, 495 S.E.2d at 137.
253. 228 Ga. App. 135, 491 S.E.2d 207 (1997).
254. Id. at 136-37, 491 S.E.2d at 209.
255. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2(a) (1998) provides: "This chapter shall not apply to ... farm
laborers ... nor to employers of such employees .... "
256. 227 Ga. App. 731, 489 S.E.2d 853 (1997).
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a farm laborer.257 Guzman performed all of the above duties for J & C,
a company hired by a chicken processor to transport its chickens from
the farms where they were raised.256 In finding that Guzman was not
a farm laborer, the court started with the well-established rule that farm
labor includes all direct and incidental activities involving agriculture
or management of livestock. 9 Yet, the court pointed out that "intensive specialization, if carried too far, is enough to transform agriculture
to commerce." 260 Because Guzman's employer was a company that had
nothing to do with the actual raising, feeding, or management of
chickens, the court concluded that he was engaged in commerce, not
agriculture.261
0. Fraud
The Board's fraud and compliance unit was created in 1995.262 This

year brought one court of appeals decision confirming that the Board and
the courts mean business when it comes to investigating potential
workers' compensation fraud. In Bahadori v. Sizzler #1543,20 Bahadori was injured while working at Sizzler. He then moved to South
Carolina and took a job at S & S Cafeterias. Although he claimed and
received additional temporary total disability benefits due to his alleged
inability to continue working at S & S as a result of the Sizzler injury,
he actually worked for S & S during that period. The Board referred
Bahadori's case to the fraud unit for investigation. Bahadori claimed the
fraud unit had no authority to investigate his case because the unit was
not established until three years after his fraud occurred. 2 ' The court
rejected this argument outright, stating that nothing in O.C.G.A. section
34-9-24 limits the fraud unit to investigation of only those frauds that
occur after July 1, 1995, and that Bahadori had produced no legal
authority in support of his position.265
P. Impeachment
Whether the employee or employer prevails in a workers' compensation case often boils down to a simple matter of credibility. Proper use
257. Id. at 732, 489 S.E.2d at 854.
258. Id.
259.

Id.

260. Id. (citing 4
(1993)).
261. Id.

ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

262. See O.C.G.A. § 34-9-24 (1998).
263. 230 Ga. App. 52, 505 S.E.2d 23 (1997).
264. Id. at 52, 55, 505 S.E.2d at 24, 26.
265. Id. at 55, 505 S.E.2d at 26.
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of impeachment evidence is therefore crucial and central to any workers'
compensation hearing. In West Marietta Hardware v. Chandler,"' the
employer attempted to defeat the employee's claim for change in
condition by offering evidence that the employee had falsified her
separation notice and used it to obtain unemployment benefits." 7 The
AIU found that "there must be inconsistent statements bearing on
material facts of the case at hand or proof of a crime involving moral
turpitude" in order for the employee to be impeached, and because
neither was the case, the ALJ refused to consider the evidence presented
by the employer.2"
The court of appeals disagreed, stating that, in addition to the various
statutory methods of impeaching a witness,26 9 a party can also impeach by showing "anything which in the slightest degree affects the
credit of an opposing witness," including a collateral issue that is only
indirectly material to the issues in the case at hand.27 The court
therefore remanded the case to the Board for a determination, under the
correct legal principles, of whether the employee was effectively
impeached."'
Q. PsychologicalInjury
Once a hot topic in Georgia workers' compensation law, the category
of psychological injury has cooled somewhat following the supreme
court's decision in Southwire v. George.2 That case reaffirmed the
long-standing rule that a purely mental or psychological injury,
unaccompanied by any physical injury, is not compensable under the
Workers' Compensation Act.273 The case of Logan v. St. Joseph
Hospital274 follows George and its predecessors insofar as Logan's
based upon their
psychological problems were held to be compensable
7
outgrowth from an on-the-job neck injury.11

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
John G.

227 Ga. App. 436, 489 S.E.2d 584 (1997).
Id. at 439, 489 S.E.2d at 587.
Id.
See O.C.G.A. §§ 24-9-80 to -84 (1998).
227 Ga. App. at 439-40, 489 S.E.2d at 587.
Id. at 440, 489 S.E.2d at 587.
266 Ga. 739, 470 S.E.2d 865 (1996).
Id. at 741, 470 S.E.2d at 866. See generally H. Michael Bagley, Daniel C. Kniffen,
Blackmon, Jr., & Phillip Comer Griffeth, Workers' Compensation, 48 MERCER L.

REV. 583, 592-93 (1996).

274. 227 Ga. App. 853, 490 S.E.2d 483 (1997).
275. Id. at 860, 490 S.E.2d at 489
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The supreme court went a step further in Abernathy v. City of
Albany," 6 declining, albeit by only a slim majority, to award compensation for a mental injury wholly unaccompanied by any kind of physical
harm.27 7 Abernathy worked as a park maintenance supervisor. When
flood waters lifted several hundred caskets from the ground and carried
them off with the current, he was given the unfortunate job of retrieving
the corpses, which resulted in gruesome physical contact with the bodies.
The experience left him with post-traumatic stress disorder, and he
sought workers' compensation benefits." 8 Although the entire court
sympathized with the horror of what Abernathy had seen, the majority
denied the claim because no actual physical injury befell him. 7 9 Chief
Justice Benham and Justices Sears and Hunstein dissented, however,
stating that they would find such an injury to be compensable,
regardless of the lack of any physical harm.2 8 0 Thus, the next time
this issue is visited, a purely psychological injury may be compensable
in this state if the supreme court's ideological makeup has since
changed.
R.

Requests for Admission

Although Rocor International v. Guyton 281 falls into this category on
its face, the decision is not so much about requests for admission as it
is about the nature of the workers' compensation system. Guyton filed
a workers' compensation claim against Rocor after he became disabled
from a heart attack. The AIJ determined that his actual employer was
282
DonCo Carriers, a subsidiary of Rocor, and a new hearing was held.
Rocor previously failed to answer requests for admission served upon it
by Guyton.283 In denying Guyton benefits, however, the ALJ gave no
weight to the employee's unanswered requests for admission, deeming
them a nullity.284 The superior court believed this was error and
reversed.288
The superior court relied upon well-settled law that
requests for admission, if not timely answered or objected to, are deemed
conclusively admitted.288 Because DonCo brought no formal motion to

276.

269 Ga. 88, 495 S.E.2d 13 (1998).

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id. at 91, 495 S.E.2d at 16.
Id. at 90, 495 S.E.2d at 16.
Id. at 91, 495 S.E.2d at 16.
Id. at 94, 495 S.E.2d at 18.
229 Ga. App. 758, 494 S.E.2d 571 (1997).
Id. at 759, 494 S.E.2d at 571-72.
Id., 494 S.E.2d at 572.

284. Id.

285. Id.
286.

Id. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-36 (1998).
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withdraw the admissions, the employee had been denied an opportunity
to argue that withdrawal would prejudice his case.2" '
The court of appeals acknowledged the above legal principles but
found them not to be controlling.28 8 Instead, the court stated the
Workers' Compensation Act was designed to furnish a speedy, inexpensive, and final resolution of claims without protracted litigation.289
The binding nature of the findings of fact made by the ALJ and the full
Board accomplished this goal.29
Although there was no formal,
written motion to withdraw the admissions, the court pointed out that
this very motion was made orally at the hearing by counsel for DonCo,
and Guyton was allowed to respond in his brief.29' Thus, in the
informal, streamlined proceedings before the Board, some of the rigors
that exist in the Civil Practice Act can apparently be relaxed in favor of
accomplishing the goals of the workers' compensation system.
S.

Statutory Employer

In the two cases addressing statutory employers this year, both
outcomes turned upon the statutory employer's relationship to the
premises where the injury occurred.
In Holton v. Georgia Power Co.,292 the employee received workers'
compensation benefits from his immediate employer, CIMCO, but
attempted to bring a tort claim against Georgia Power, which owned and
maintained the property where he was injured. Georgia Power defended,
claiming it was the statutory employer of Holton pursuant to O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-8, and that it was thereby insulated from tort liability to
him.29 The court of appeals agreed.294 It noted that, generally, an
owner in control of premises is not a statutory employer.295 In this
case, however, Georgia Power not only owned and controlled the
premises but also contracted to perform maintenance of the premises.296 This maintenance work was sublet to CIMCO, and Holton was
injured under those circumstances.2 97 Consequently, Georgia Power

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

229 Ga. App. at 759-60, 494 S.E.2d at 572. See also O.C.G.A. § 9-11-36(b).
229 Ga. App. at 760-61, 494 S.E.2d at 573.
Id. at 761, 494 S.E.2d at 573.
Id.
Id.
228 Ga. App. 135, 491 S.E.2d 207 (1997).
Id. at 136, 491 S.E.2d at 209.
Id. at 137, 491 S.E.2d at 209.
Id. at 136, 491 S.E.2d at 209.
Id., 491 S.E.2d at 208.
Id.
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was the statutory employer, and Holton's sole remedy was under the
Workers' Compensation Act.2 98
In Beers Construction Co. v.Doyle,'99 the court of appeals highlighted the legal requirement that the statutory employer theory is applied
only when "the injury occurred on, in, or about the premises on which
the principal contractor has undertaken to execute work or which are
otherwise under his control or management." °° Beers subcontracted
with Nix to provide millwork and cabinetry for a hospital project. Doyle,
an employee of Nix, severed three fingers while cutting cabinet pieces at
Nix's workshop. When Nix proved to be uninsured for workers'
compensation accidents, Doyle brought a claim against Beers as the
statutory employer.'
However, because the accident took place in
Nix's workshop, where Beers had no actual management or control and
could not affect the risks, the tort claim was dismissed.0 2
T

Subrogation
Subrogation returned to Georgia's Workers' Compensation Act in
1992,303 and the case law is slowly fleshing out the specific parameters
of this right. The past year brought several important subrogation
decisions.
In Bartow County Board of Education v. Ray, 0 4 the court of appeals
addressed how the employer should prove that an employee is fully and
completely compensated,3 5 such that its subrogation lien could be
satisfied. 306 In that case, the jury gave Ray a general verdict for
$175,000. Her employer, the school board, intervened in the third party
action and asserted its subrogation lien. Because Ray received more
than her special damages, the school board argued they were entitled to
satisfaction of their lien. 30 7

The court of appeals disagreed. 3 08

It

noted that the employer presented no evidence on the issue of full and
complete compensation. 30 9 The court stated that, simply because a
jury's award exceeds the amount of special damages, it could not be

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id. at 137, 491 S.E.2d at 209.
230 Ga. App. 593, 496 S.E.2d 921 (1998).
Id. at 594, 496 S.E.2d at 921. See O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8(d) (1998).
230 Ga. App. at 594, 496 S.E.2d at 921.
Id. at 595, 496 S.E.2d at 922.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1 (1998).
229 Ga. App. 333, 494 S.E.2d 29 (1997).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1(b).
229 Ga. App. at 334, 494 S.E.2d at 30.
Id. at 333-34, 494 S.E.2d at 30.
Id. at 334-35, 494 S.E.2d at 30-31.
Id. at 335, 494 S.E.2d at 31.
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presumed that the jury had fully and completely compensated the
employee for all losses."' 0 Even though it is not specifically required
by the statute, the better and more logical practice was to request a
special verdict form asking the jury if its verdict made the employee
whole.3 '
The trial court in Sommers v. State Compensation Insurance Fund 12
found that the employee was made whole, and satisfaction of employer's
subrogation lien was ordered.1 3 However, Sommers appealed and
sought to prevent the employer from taking any part of her recovery.
She argued the trial court was wrong to allow the intervention. 14 The
court of appeals rejected this argument outright, stating that O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-11.1 gives the employer an absolute right to intervene if it
chooses to do so, and that it may intervene even after the expiration of
the statute of limitations. 15 Sommers also argued that only a jury
could make a determination of whether the employee was made
whole. 1 6 Because Sommers agreed to have the jury remain unaware
that she received collateral benefits from her employer, the court found
that she had waived the right to have a jury address this issue, "even if
ever there was such a right." 1 7 Because the evidence supported the
judge's decision, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment granting
satisfaction of the subrogation lien.1 '
In Stewart v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co.,31 the court of appeals
dealt with the issue of what payments to an employee could be subject
to a subrogation lien. Stewart received workers' compensation benefits
from Auto-Owners, her employer's workers' compensation carrier, and
also sought payment from her own insurance company under her
uninsured motorist ("UM") policy.3 20 Auto-Owners asserted a subrogation lien against the money Stewart received under her UM policy, but
the court held that UM benefits are not subject to such a lien. 21 The
court stated that those payments were not a recovery from a negligent
third party but were made pursuant to a contractual obligation arising

310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id.
Id.
229 Ga. App. 352, 494 S.E.2d 82 (1997).
Id. at 352, 494 S.E.2d at 84.
Id.
Id. at 352-53, 494 S.E.2d at 84.
Id. at 352, 494 S.E.2d at 84.
Id. at 354, 494 S.E.2d at 85.
Id. at 355, 494 S.E.2d at 86.
230 Ga. App. 265, 495 S.E.2d 882 (1998).
Id. at 265, 495 S.E.2d at 883.
Id. at 268, 495 S.E.2d at 888.
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under Stewart's own car insurance policy. 22 Nothing in the subrogation code section authorizes an insurer to assert a subrogation lien
against UM payments. 2 s
U. Superior Court Appeals
There were several decisions this year regarding appeals to the
superior court. In Truckstops of America, Inc. v. Engram,24 the court
of appeals answered the question of whether the July 1, 1997 amendment to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-105, regarding the scheduling of a hearing
or entry of an award within sixty days of the date of docketing of the
appeal, has retroactive effect." 5 The court held that the amendment
does not, noting that statutory amendments generally prescribe only for
the future unless a contrary intent is shown. 2 s The court also pointed
out that giving the amendment retroactive effect in this case would
deprive
the employer of a victory that had already been final for over a
27
3

year.

In Pine Timber Trucking Co. v. Teal, 8 the issue was whether an
order was timely entered by the superior court. The superior court held
a hearing on December 18, 1996 and reversed the full Board's decision
in an order dated January 9, 1997.329 The court of appeals held that
the superior court's order was a nullity because it was not entered
within twenty days of the hearing, as prescribed by O.C.G.A. section 349-105(b).3 °'
Finally, Gilman Paper Co. v. Davis3s ' stands for the proposition that
there is no appeal to the superior courts from an interlocutory order of

322. Id.
323. Id., 495 S.E.2d at 884.
324. 229 Ga. App. 616, 494 S.E.2d 709 (1997).
325. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b) (1998) previously stated, in relevant part:
The case so appealed may then be brought by either party upon ten days' written
notice to the other before the superior court for a hearing upon such record,...
provided, however, if the court does not hear the case within 60 days of the date
of docketing in the superior court, the decision of the board shall be considered
affirmed by operation of law ....
326. 229 Ga. App. at 617, 494 S.E.2d at 711.
327. Id. at 618, 494 S.E.2d at 712.
328. 230 Ga. App. 362, 496 S.E.2d 270 (1998).
329. Id. at 362, 496 S.E.2d at 271.
330. Id. at 362-63,496 S.E.2d at 271. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b) (1998) states, in pertinent

part: "[T]he decision of the board shall be considered affirmed by operation of law if no
order of the court disposing of the issues on appeal has been entered within 20 days after
the date of the continued hearing."
331. 230 Ga. App. 364, 496 S.E.2d 469 (1998).
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the Board."3 2 On the contrary, only a final award-one either granting
or denying compensation-can be appealed to the superior court
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-105."' Thus, an interlocutory order
reinstating Gilman's benefits pending an evidentiary hearing was held
to have been improperly heard by the superior court, and the employer's
appeal was dismissed.3 4
V

Superadded Injury

In those superadded injury cases which have been reported, the claim
of a mental or physical condition superimposed upon the original on-thejob injury was rejected more times than not. The recent court of appeals
decision in J.M. Huber Corp. v. Holliday3 5 is no exception. Holliday
suffered a compensable left knee injury in 1985 while working for Huber.
He returned to work in a fairly sedentary job, suffering from occasional
popping and instability in his knee. Ten years later, while walking in
the woods for recreation, Holliday's right foot got caught in some vines.
He shifted his weight to his left leg, the left knee gave out, and he
fractured his patella. 3 6
The ALJ found that the fracture constituted "a new injury, separate
and distinct from [Holliday's] original knee condition."337 However, the
ALJ then concluded that it was a superadded injury because the
weakened condition of Holliday's left knee was the proximate cause of
the fall. 3 8 The court of appeals found this to be a misapplication of
the superadded injury theory, which covers an injury that "generally
arises as a natural consequence of, or directly from, the original event
and is not the result of a new event or accident."33 9 That being the
case, the fractured patella could not be a superadded injury because of
the ALJ's finding of a new accident.' ° Finally, the court of appeals
pointed out that superadded injury involves an injury, disorder, or
condition to a different part of the body from the one originally
injured.34' Because this was the same knee originally injured in 1985,
Holliday's claim was not viable.342
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Even though the court rejected Holliday's superadded injury argument,
it did not go so far as to invalidate the theory, as the employer
urged.3 43 The court responded that "there will certainly be those cases
in which the application of the superadded injury theory is necessary to
effect3 the humane, remedial purposes of the Workers' Compensation
Act." 4

V.

CONCLUSION

Practitioners should be especially mindful of the legislative amendments affecting the admissibility of evidence in workers' compensation
cases and the calculation of certain benefits. In addition, it can be
anticipated that the court of appeals will issue new decisions further
delineating the scope of the decision in Padgett45 and its effect on
post-accident employment terminations.

343. Id. at 6-7, 491 S.E.2d at 76.
344. Id. at 7, 491 S.E.2d at 76.
345. Padgett v. Waffle House, Inc., 269 Ga. 105, 498 S.E.2d 499 (1998).

